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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on May 31,2005. R. 793. The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-22(4), Utah Code Ann.
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no controlling regulatory or statutory provisions.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err by failing to excuse potential challenged jurors for

cause after they manifested prejudices against Plaintiffs who sue doctors and biases in favor
of doctors, and after these potential jurors expressed opinions that they would not be able to
fairly consider the evidence in this case, and were Plaintiffs prejudiced because of this?
2.

Did the trial court err by excluding all evidence of admissions made by

Dr. Zeluff, including statements that he had "jumped the gun" in performing surgery on Mr.
Woods, that he had "missed something" and thus unnecessarily performed surgery on Mr.
Woods, and that he "should not have done this surgery," when such statements were highly
probative of material issues in the case and were not unfairly prejudicial?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 14, 2001, Appellee Gary Zeluff, M.D. performed a right-toe MTPimplant surgery, which Plaintiffs claim was unnecessary. This surgery was a failure and
required multiple additional procedures by other surgeons to repair. The unnecessary surgery
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and subsequent repair surgeries left Steven Woods permanently disabled. At issue in this case
was whether Dr. Zeluff failed to consider and offer conservative treatments for Mr. Woods'
right toe pain before recommending and removing Mr. Woods' toe joint and replacing it with
an implant. Also at issue in the case was whether Dr. Zeluff misdiagnosed Mr. Woods' toe
pain, whether he failed to refer Mr. Woods to a rheumatologist before considering surgery,
and whether he incorrectly determined that Mr. Woods was a candidate for MTP-implant
surgery.
During a post-operative visit, Dr. Zeluff acknowledged his error in
recommending and performing the implant surgery, telling Mr. Woods that he had "jumped
the gun," that at the time he decided to do the surgery he had "missed something," and that
he "should not have done the surgery." Before trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to
exclude the admissions mentioned above. The trial court granted Defendants' Motion and
ordered as precluded any and all evidence of Dr. Zeluff s admissions, ruling that the
probative value of his admissions were substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Under the judge's ruling, Plaintiffs' were also precluded from using these
admissions to impeach the Defendant.
This matter was tried to a jury on April 4-8, 2005. The jury returned their
verdict on April 8, 2005, finding for the Defendant. During jury selection on April 4,2005,
potential jurors expressed strong prejudices against attorneys who sue doctors, biases in favor
of medical doctors, and opinions that they would not be able to fairly consider evidence
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di II ing the trial / Vppel lants cl: lallenged six potei itial ]\ irors for ca 1 lsebecai lse of bias, bi it the
Court excused only one of them. A timely notice of appeal was filed. Plaintiff asserts herein
error in the failure to excuse jurors for cause and in excluding admissions of a partyopponent, A fie w trial ii 1 tl lis i natter is requested.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The factual statements relevant to this appeal are as follows:
1

Defense Files Motion to Keep Out Admissions. Oi 1 March 25,2005,

Defendant Filed a Motion in I .in i ine at id a Memorandi ii i i it i Si lpport R 51 1 561 It: l the
Motion, Defendants sought to preclude Plaintiffs' use of certain admissions b> Dr. Zeluff
related to his surgery on Plaintiff. Mr. Woods testified during his deposition as follows;
Q. Okay. There's a mention in one of the medical records, I believe
it's Dr. Rasmussen's, that you reported to him that shortly after the surgery Dr.
Zeluff said something to you to the effect that he should not have replaced the
joint and should have referred you to an infectious disease specialist. Did you
report that to Dr. Rasmussen?
A, I may have, or Dr. Stromquist. That was said to me so I may
have reported that to any doctor that I have seen.
Q- Okay.
A, Tliat is possible. '
Q. Tell me everything y ou remember about Dr. Zeluff s comments
on those issues.
A I had been seeing Dr. Pilgrim because Dr. Zeluff was out of town
and when he came back to town his wife originally walked in and told me, I
told him he shouldn't have done this. And then he shortly afterwards walked
in and said, I jumped the gun. I don't think we should have done this
surgery. You need to go see a different doctor.
Q. And did you ask him any questions about those comments as to
what he meant by that?
i\ I started crying. I didn't ask him anything.
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Q. Did he give you any more information as to what it was that he
could have done short of surgery?
A. I've missed something. That's all that I know. He didn't say
anything else that he could have done.
Q. When you say I've missed something, did he say that?
A. He said that.
Q. He said, I've missed something?
A. I've missed something.
Q. And you didn't ask him any clarification about that?
A. No. I was pretty upset at that point.
R. 537-38 (emphasis added).
Defendants argued in their moving papers that the statements were
inadmissable heresy, that they did not qualify for a hearsay exception, and that they
improperly suggested Dr. Zeluff was negligent. R. 518-523. Nowhere in their moving papers,
however, did the Defendants argue that the evidence should be excluded under Rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 808:38.
2.

Plaintiffs Oppose Defendants9 Motion. On April 1, 2005, Plaintiffs

filed their opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine. R. 568-574. In their opposition,
Plaintiffs asserted that the statements by Dr. Zeluff were admissions that qualify as
exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 801 (b)(2)A, Utah Rules of Evidence. No Rule 403
argument was made since none had been offered by Defendants. R. 808:38.
3.

Rule 403 Balancing Introduced by Judge at Hearing. Although the

defense never even raised the issue, the Court, sua sponte, ruled preliminarily at an April 1,
2005, hearing on Defendants' Motions in Limine that under Rule 403, Utah Rules of
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Evidence, that the probative value of Dr. Zeluff s statements was outweighed by its potential
prejudice. R. 807:3,808:38.
4.

Court Found Admissions Both Relevant and Probative. At the April

1, 2005, Motion in Limine hearing, the Court found Dr. Zeluff s statements to be both
relevant ("of course it's relevant to some extent. You can hardly say that's not relevant")and
to have probative value ("I think it has probative value but very limited probative value").
See R. 807:3. Later during the hearing, the Court indicated that the admissions were "highly
probative of medical negligence" and for this reason they were "highly prejudicial." R.
807:21 (emphasis added). The Court did not find that the statements to be confusing. R.
807:9.
5.

Supplemental Briefing Asserts No Rule 403 Preclusion. On April 4,

2005, Plaintiffs submitted supplemental briefing to address the Rule 403 issue the Court had
raised. R. 615-620. In this briefing, Plaintiffs vigorously asserted that the statements of Dr.
Zeluff were highly probative of issues in the case, including whether Dr. Zeluff should have:
(1) obtained a family history which would have informed him that Mr. Woods was not a
candidate for surgery, (2) referred Mr. Woods for treatment by a rheumatologist and (3)
removed a healthy joint upon opening Mr. Woods' toe and discovering the joint was not
diseased. R. 616. Plaintiffs also asserted that it was only the Plaintiffs who would be unfairly
prejudiced should the evidence be excluded. R.618.
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6.

Exclusion Order Signed by Court On April 4, 2005, the Court

preliminarily granted Defendants' Motions in Limine No. 1 (motion to exclude statements),
reserving the final decision pending supplemental briefing. R. 624. Defendants' Order on
Defendants' Motions in Limine was signed on this date as well. R. 624-626. The relevant
portions of the Order read:
Evidence that Dr. Zeluff said he jumped the gun, missed something, or should
not have done the subject surgery is inadmissable on the grounds that the
testimony is minimally probative and is substantially outweighed by the
dangers of unfair prejudice. If Plaintiffs can come up with something, the
Court will reconsider the ruling.
7.

Plaintiffs Prevented from Using Admissions for Impeachment.

During a hearing on the admissions issue held April 5, 2005, Plaintiffs asserted that the
admissions of Dr. Zeluff could come in as impeachment evidence. R. 807:17-18. The Court
indicated that these statements could be used for impeachment if they were used "strictly to
show lack of credibility." Id. The Court indicated it would not allow the admissions to be
used strictly for standard of care purposes. R. 807:18. The Court did suggest, however, that
if the Defense asserted that Mr. Woods pushed for the operation, that Dr. Zeluff s statements
that he "jumped the gun" or "shouldn't have done the surgery" or "I missed something"
could come in. The Court stated:
[I]f the Defendant is going to argue or submit evidence that Mr. Woods made
the decision, he was the primary factor and that is a defense to any malpractice
claim, then I would almost certainly let you get into the statements....
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R. 808:130 (emphasis added). When counsel pointed out that this evidence was already in
a chart note that the parties had already stipulated to, where Dr. Zeluff wrote that "Steve ..
. came in today very strongly considering the [procedure]" and that he "has some friends who
have had this procedure done and it [sic] knows the excellent results it can potentially
[provide]" (R. 808:130-31), the Court changed its position. Id Its response to counsel was
that "[y]ou're still not addressing the fundamental legal issue and that's probative value
versus prejudicial effect. . .." R. 808:131. The Court subsequently ruled on April 5, 2005,
that the statements would not come in for any reason. R. 808:132.
8.

Jury Selection, The trial court conducted a general voir dire in the

courtroom with all the potential jurors, and later adjourned to chambers to conduct individual
voir dire, with counsel asking questions to probe for bias. R. 808:1-127. As the voir dire for
each potential juror was concluded, the parties were asked to pass or challenge for cause. The
Court thereupon ruled on the challenges. Six potential jurors were challenged for cause by
Plaintiffs due to bias. R. 808:107-119. Only one of these challenges was granted. R. 808:114.
The remaining five challenges were denied. R. 808:111-115,120,126. Plaintiffs were forced
to exercise their three peremptory challenges to remove these venire persons from the jury.
R. 709.
9.

Overall Bias of Jury Pool. The overall makeup of the jury pool was for

the most part, very anti-plaintiff. Many of the venire had heard discussion concerning tort
reform and a medical malpractice "crisis" during the recent presidential election when this
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was a big issue. R. 808:1-11. A significant percentage of the jury venire (20 of 28, or 71%),
expressed their belief that medical malpractice claims increased medical costs and/or
insurance rates. R. 808:6-12. Nine of the potential jurors expressed their concern that a
verdict in Plaintiffs' favor would cost them personally. R. 808:13-15. When potential jurors
were asked if they would feel comfortable if they were counsel having someone with their
frame of mind sit on the jury, ten of them indicated they would not. R. 808:18. Concerning
this question, the defense later commented to the judge: "I was surprised to see so many of
them raise their hand." R. 808:29. The Court responded: "It's more than I've ever had. Id.
10.

Jurors Challenged for Cause. The following jurors were challenged

by Plaintiffs for cause:
a. George Morgan. Potential Juror No. 2 indicated during voir dire
that he felt that medical malpractice lawsuits have increased the cost of medical care and/or
insurance: "I feel like medical malpractice insurance was raising our insurance rates." R.
808:40. He lamented that because of this, his small business has a hard time being able to
afford health insurance premiums, which he says, "just keep escalating." R. 808:40. Mr.
Morgan also indicated that given these feelings, he would be unable to follow Court
instruction concerning the awarding of damages. R. 808:15-16, 22. After some lengthy
"rehabilitation" by the Court, this juror stated that while he would now not have a problem
awarding damages if liability was proven, he would be conservative in his award. R. 808:41.
During voir dire, Mr. Morgan also revealed that his daughter was a defense lawyer and did
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most of her work for "some big insurance company/' and that he talked with her about her
cases and her work. R. 80 8:41. The judge then asked him that despite his conservative nature,
if he was "willing to be able to be at least fair." R. 808:41-42. Mr. Morgan responded with
a"yes."M
Because of the bias mentioned above, Mr. Morgan was challenged for cause
by Plaintiffs. R. 808:107. In response, the Court denied the challenge providing as a basis its
statement: "I believe he showed himself to be able to be a fair and impartial juror." R.
808:110-111. Plaintiffs subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse this juror.
R. 709.
b. David Moss. Potential Juror No. 3 expressed during voir dire that
he felt medical malpractice lawsuits have caused the cost of medical care and/or insurance
to increase. R. 808:12. He further indicated that he would be unable to follow the Court's
instruction in awarding a fair and impartial verdict given his bias. R. 808:13-16. He also
revealed that he would be uncomfortable having himself as a juror if he were legal counsel.
R. 808:18. During in-chambers discussion with Mr. Moss, he admitted his bias: "I know
nothing about this case but I have a concern about people that are kind ofprofessional
litigants now looking and trying to just find ways to make money'' R. 808:44 (emphasis
added). He then stated that this "is a bias that I do carry I think that is potentially, I don't
want to say damaging, but it's there." R. 808:44 (emphasis added).
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After some rehabilitation by the Court, which the judge jokingly referred to as
"beat[ing] up," Mr. Moss responded that he would try to be, in essence, fair. R. 808: 44-45.
This rehabilitation, however, proved to be elusive as Mr. Moss held firm to his bias against
awarding damages and was adamant that he would be unable to award a "full amount" of
damages:
Q: I think the judge asked you if he ordered you to put that aside,
would you be able to award a full amount of damages, and you said no.
A: I think, I guess what I should say is I couldn't just say yes. . . . I
don }t know that I could just look at you right now and say okay, I will do
that, I might
Q: But you're saying you're not sure if you will be able to do
that?
A: I couldn't say 100 percent, no, again, just the fact that I think I would
like to be that way.
R. 808:45-47 (emphasis added).
Mr. Moss was subsequently challenged for cause by Plaintiffs. R. 808:111-12.
The Court in responding to this challenge stated that "Mr. Moss in the courtroom gave me
concern . . . . " R. 808:111 (emphasis added). The Court then provided its basis for its denial
of Plaintiffs' challenge:
He was much more open. He says he likes to think he can be impartial He
does have a concern aboutfrivolous litigation andprofessional litigants. He
cannot award just whatever someone requests but he can weight [sic] the
evidence and look at it and award what the evidence warrants.
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R. 808:112. (emphasis added). Because Plaintiffs used up their peremptories excusing other
jurors they had challenged for cause, they were unable to prevent this person from sitting on
the jury. R. 709.
c. Kent Anderson. Potential Juror No. 7 indicated as others before him
had that he felt malpractice lawsuits had driven up the cost of medical care and/or insurance.
R. 808:12. He told the Court he was concerned about medical malpractice suits: "it's on the
news (inaudible) mostly that medical malpractice [awards] are becoming excessive and there
needs to be something done about it...."

R. 808:3-4 (emphasis added). He told the Court

that his feelings as to the excessiveness of some awards could influence his thinking. He
stated "I don't really think about it but I think it is a potential problem. I think so." R. 808:4
(emphasis added). Mr. Anderson later stated that while his bias might not stop him from
giving an award, it would affect the amount. R. 808:13-14. In chambers, the judge attempted
to rehabilitate Mr. Anderson as to how his bias would affect a damage award. He then
admitted his bias:
The Court: So recognizing that the real issue is is [sic] that your [sic]
don't tie your damage award to your feelings about increased insurance, cost
increase of medical, tort crisis whatever. You think you can do that in a single
case?
A: I think I could
The Court: Do you have any doubt about that? Just a little bit about
the way you said it makes me have to ask it again.
A: No, you know, Vm concerned but I think in an individual case it
(inaudible).
R. 808:55-56. (emphasis added).
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Later when he was asked whether he would hesitate making a damage award
based on his bias, he admitted: "well, I think to be perfectly honest, there's a little bit of
hesitation but I would certainly be open and try to look, you know, at both side[s] and issues.
R. 808:57-58 (emphasis added).
Mr. Anderson was also subsequently challenged for cause. R. 808:114. The
Court denied the challenge for cause and provided as its basis: "The Court believes that Mr.
Anderson did state a willingness and openness and ability to be a fair and impartial juror and
the statements you identify do not overcome that. . . ." R. 808:114-15. To keep this juror
from being empaneled, Plaintiffs were forced to exercise one of their peremptory challenges.
R. 709.
d. Douglas McOmie. Potential Juror No. 13, a probation officer by
profession, indicated during general voir dire that he had a negative impression of attorneys.
R. 808:28-29,76. He also indicated that he would not be comfortable if he were legal counsel
having someone like himself sit in judgment on him. R. 808:58. During in-chambers voir
dire, he acknowledged his concerns regarding increased medical costs or insurance premium
increases that came from malpractice claims (R. 808:74-76) and expressed his feelings
concerning those who sue:
Q: I think you used the word bitter, didn't you, that you had some
bitter feelings about those who sue?
A: Yes, and just because of this particular incident that my son has been
faced with, just the circumstances and I don't know if you want me to go into
that.
The Court: If it effects [sic] you we do, if it doesn't[,] fine.
-12-

A:

It [ajffects me.

R: 808:77 (emphasis added).
Mr. McCombie then explained that he was upset because someone had sued
his son concerning a car accident his son was involved in. R. 808:78. He explained that the
suit was "kind of a shock to everybody" and that "everybody [has] been under some strain"
because ofit.R. 808:78.
His feelings on this issue were probed by Plaintiffs' attorneys:
Q: Do you think that experience would tend to influence the way you
view this case particularly since we're the ones, we attorneys right here have
brought suit against this doctor, do you think you'd tend to look less favorably
on us and our case?
A: That's hard to say. I think it's possible. It's possible it may.
R. 808:77-78 (emphasis added). Following this revelation of bias, defense counsel attempted
to rehabilitate him with argumentative questioning:
Q:
Mr. McCobie, do you think that you could sit throughout this trial for
the next several days putting aside prior experiences, your son's experience
and listen to the evidence and listen to the instructions on the law and apply the
law to the evidence in making a decision about this case and this case alone if
you're instructed to do so?
A
I can certainly try.
You would make every attempt to do that?
Q
Yes, I would try.
A
And you believe you'd be capable of doing that?
Q
Ahhh, I would hope so. I can't say for sure but I would hope that I
A
could.
R. 808:79 (emphasis added). Even these efforts showed that this person's deep-seated biases
remained firmly entrenched.
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This juror was naturally challenged for cause by Plaintiffs. The Court in
responding to this challenge responded: "/ am really on the fence on this man and it's
mostly that I'm worried against about his distraction" (recent difficulties in his life, including
a daughter's upcoming marriage, financial problems and marital stress). R. 808:75, 116
(emphasis added). After the judge was "rehabilitated" by defense counsel regarding the
irrelevancy of distraction in this juror's life, and after he heard defense's claim that "we're
getting down to a number situation," the judge announced: "I don't think there's cause, as
I say certainly not in terms of any bias." R. 808:116-17. Plaintiffs subsequently burned up
yet another peremptory challenge excusing this "bitter" juror. R. 709.
e. Robert Wilkey. Potential Juror No. 20, is an EMS helicopter pilot
who had served ten years active duty in the Army. R. 808:93. He expressed a strong bias
from the start when the Court during voir dire inquired as to whether prospective jurors felt
malpractice cases affected medical care or insurance. R. 808:6-7, 9, 87. At that time he
stated:
I've heard about a consortium of Las Vegas OB/GYN doctors who no longer
are taking patients due to the malpractice situation they have and ongoing
stuff. With my affiliation with the University of Utah Medical Center and
hearing people there talk about it, so I've heard a lot about i t . . . .
R. 808:9.
The Court then had the following discussion with Mr. Wilkey:
The Court: Okay. So you've heard quite a lot. Has it left you unable
to be a fair and impartial juror or do you think you can still A: / must say I'm somewhat tainted on the subject
-14-

The Court: Somewhattainted? Fair enough. It's something that's been
on over quite a period for you it sounds like?
A: Yes.
R. 808:9 (emphasis added).
This juror's belief that a Plaintiffs verdict would make his insurance rates go
up was such that he expressed that he would be unable to put aside these feelings to render
a fair and impartial verdict. R. 808:13-14. He also indicated to the Court that he had negative
feelings about lawyers who represent patients (R. 808:17), that he would not be comfortable
sitting in judgment on himself (R. 808:18) and that he had a bias in favor of those in the
military. R. 808:18,91.
When the judge and counsel retired into chambers, the Court provided its initial
impression of Mr. Wilkey:
The Court: Robert Wilkey, to tell you the truth, if one ofyou made
a motion, I'd probably grant it because I think the guy is desperately trying
to be negative. We'll bring him in here we'll get another ten minutes of it.
R. 808:32 (emphasis added).
The Court then had the following conversation with defense counsel, who
appeared interested in protecting Wilkey from a for-cause challenge:
The Court:
Defense:
The Court:
Defense:

Do you want to see him?
Yes, Your Honor, because I think if you get him in hereHe just might straighten up. I don't think he will.
He '11 straighten up andfly right.

R. 808:32 (emphasis added).
The Court expressed its doubt that this juror would "straighten up":
-15-

The Court:

But I cannot say that it's impossible to turn him around

butPlaintiff:
He said he was tainted.
The Court: Oh, he's even got the military issue. What did he miss?
Defense:
Well, the military The Court: He starts out somewhat tainted after he has some strong
feelings and then he does the damage issue and then he has issues of toes, his
father, father's got arthritis, he's negative about lawyers and he's biased about
the military.
R. 808:32.
Mr. Wilkey was even more forthcoming regarding his bias when he was
brought into chambers. Once there, he discussed his desire for tort reform, including damage
caps (R. 808:88) and presented the following diatribe against those who bring medical
negligence actions:
Medical science is not an exact science. Things happen, things do happen and
people, I think, do honestly try to do their best and / think malpractice and
neglect are very strong words and proving true malpractice I think is a
difficult thing and I think it's just, you know, positive outcomes aren't always
the case and you can't be guaranteed a positive outcome. And so, a lot oftimes
when people don't get a positive outcome they just say it was the doctor's
fault.
R. 808:88 (emphasis added).
After he was told that defendant Dr. Zeluff served in the National Guard, Mr.
Wilkey came clean on his bias in favor of those who serve in the military:
The Court: I guess Dr. Zeluff has served in the Guard, would that
make any difference to you?
A:
I mean / do like prior service people. I mean, I tend to kind of,
J don't want to say side with them, hut I can understand where they're
coming from, I understand their thinking process, their mentality.
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R. 808:91 (emphasis added).
Despite the Court's initial (correct) impressions about Mr. Wilkey's hopeless
bias, it denied Plaintiffs' challenge for cause, providing as its sole basis: "most critically to
me he seemed extremely open to following instruction." R. 808:119-120.
With Plaintiffs' peremptories used up, Plaintiffs were unable to remove this
juror and he was empaneled with others in deciding this case - against Mr. Woods.
f.

Ryan Duckworth. Potential juror No. 6 was the only juror challenged

for bias that was actually excused for cause by the Court. His bias was revealed during
general voir dire when he indicated he felt medical malpractice claims were increasing
medical and/or insurance costs and that his feelings on this would affect his ability to be fair
in awarding damages if there was a basis for such an award. R. 808:49. During continued inchambers voir dire with this juror, Mr. Duckworth told the Court: "To be honest, if I were
going in at this point, I would probably be in favor of the doctor because [another] doctor
saved my daughter's foot." R. 808:50. When the Court told him that all the Plaintiffs had to
do was "tip the scale just a little bit so you believe it's more likely than not that the doctor
was negligent" this juror responded that "he'd have to prove it without a shadow of doubt"
R. 808:52 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs moved to have Mr. Duckworth struck for cause. R. 808:113. The
Court granted Plaintiffs' request, stating that because of his firm, favorable bias toward
doctors, the challenge was legitimate. R. 808:114.
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11.

Dr. Zeluff Disposes of Toe Joint. At trial, Defendant Dr. Zeluff

testified that he did not remove a healthy joint from Mr. Woods' body. R. 808:209. He
testified that the joint was diseased. R. 808:211. He also testified that following the joint's
removal, that he sent it to pathology "for disposal" and that he chose not to have it analyzed
by a third party. R. 808:188, 210. Nowhere in the record did he record the condition of the
joint. R. 808:190. Dr. Zeluff testified that it would be a breach of the standard of care if he
removed an undamaged joint. R. 808:193.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL
TO EXCUSE FIVE POTENTIAL JURORS FOR CAUSE DUE TO BIAS.
A,

The Law of Excusing Jurors for Cause. Litigants are entitled to a jury

that is fair and impartial. West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, ^ 12, 103 P. 3d 708. The Court of
Appeals has held that voir dire questions must be allowed "so as to allow counsel to
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges." Davis v. Grand County Service Area, dba
Allen Memorial Hospital 905 P.2d 988, 993 (Utah 1995).
Rule 47(f)(6) of the Utah Rules of Procedure, provides the applicable
guidelines for removing a juror for cause. According to the Rule, removal is required when
"[cjonduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances . . . reasonably lead the Court to
conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if
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challenged, unless thejudge is convinced thejuror can and will act impartially and fairly."
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6) (emphasis added). Voir dire responses which expose a juror's bias
or partiality, "give rise to a presumption that a potentialjuror is biased, and the juror must
be dismissed unless that presumption is rebutted.". Furthermore, "[o]nce statements are
made during voir dire that 'facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of
discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or
counsel investigates farther and finds the inference rebutted.'" West, 2004 UT 97 at *f 14,
accord State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 27, 24 P.3d 948.
The Court in West went on to describe how a presumption of bias or partiality
may be rebutted:
Rebutting a presumption of bias or partiality may be accomplished if the
challenged juror, upon further questioning, provides reason to believe that her
previous statements showing evidence of bias were "merely the product of a
' light impression' and not one that would' close the mind against the testimony
that may be offered in opposition.'" Under our case law, however, a
presumption of bias cannot be rebutted solely by a juror's bare assurance of
her own impartiality because a challenged juror cannot reasonably be
expected to judge her own fitness to serve. The trial court must focus on the
juror's expressions of attitudes, opinions, and feelings about subjects related
to the case, rather than on the juror's assessment of her own objectivity. "A
statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much
of its meaning in light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias.

West, 2004 UT 97, ^f 15 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court's instruction in West is supported by the Advisory
Committee note to Rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
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Paragraph (f)(6). The Utah Supreme Court has noted a tendency of trial court
judges to rule against a challenge for cause in the face of legitimate questions
about a juror's biases. The Supreme Court limited the following admonition
to capital cases, but it is a sound philosophy even in trials of lesser
consequence.
In determining challenges for cause, the task of the judge is to find the proper
balance. It is not the judge's duty to seat a jury from a too-small venire panel
or to seat a jury as quickly as possible. Although thorough questioning of a
juror to determine the existence, nature and extent of a bias is appropriate, it
is not the judge's duty to extract the "right" answerfrom or to "rehabilitate"
a juror. The judge should accept honest answers to understood questions and,
based on that evidence, make the sometimes difficult decision to seat only
those jurors the judge is convinced will act fairly and impartially.
•• •

The objective of a challenge for cause is to remove from the venire panel
persons who cannot act impartially in deliberating upon a verdict. The lack of
impartiality may be due to some bias for or against one of the parties; it may
be due to an opinion about the subject matter of the action or about the action
itself.
The amendments focus on the state of mind clause. In determining whether a
person can act impartially, the Court should focus not only on that person's
state of mind but should consider the totality of the circumstances. These
circumstances might include the experiences, conduct, statements, opinions,
or associations of the juror. Rather than determining that the juror is
"prevented" from acting impartially, the Court should determine whether the
juror "is not likely to act impartially." These amendments conform to the
directive of the Supreme Court: If there is a legitimate question about the
ability of a person to act impartially, the court should remove that person
from the panel.
This new standard for challenges for cause represents a balance more easily
stated than achieved. These amendments encourage judges to exercise greater
care in evaluating challenges for cause and to resolve legitimate doubts in
favor of removal. This may mean some jurors now removed by peremptory
challenge will be removed instead for cause. It may also mean the Court will
have to summon more prospective jurors for voir dire. Whether lawyers will
use fewer peremptory challenges will have to await the judgment of
experience.
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Rule 47, Advisory Committee Note (emphasis added).
Mr. Woods lost his original toe joint due to Dr. Zeluff s negligence. This trial
was his only opportunity to get justice. It was thus crucial that he got a fair jury. Because
Plaintiff raised legitimate questions as to six of the potential jurors' beliefs and biases, all six
of these jurors should have been struck for cause. See State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 650
(Utah 1995). As it turns out, only one of these six was excused.
B.

Excusing Challenged Jurors for Potential Bias. Failure to excuse a

juror for cause in a medical malpractice case, when cause exists, which forces the Plaintiff
to use a peremptory challenge to strike that juror, is reversible error. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627
P.2d 533 (Utah 1981).
The law of Saunders II, a child sexual abuse case, is instructive for the Court
in this case. In Saunders II, the Defendant claimed reversible error based upon the failure to
remove one juror for cause. State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1995). In
response to the question about whether she could be fair and impartial in deciding the case,
the juror stated, "It wouldn't prevent me. It might make me uncomfortable. " (This is similar
to the expressions of doubt about being fair held by jurors in this case. See Facts lOa-e.) The
trial court apparently then "rehabilitated" the juror and refused to excuse her for cause, which
resulted in a peremptory challenge being used up. The Court of Appeals upheld a verdict
against the Defendant on the basis that the Defendant would have to show that the failure to
remove that juror "actually prejudiced his case." Id. The Supreme Court reversed, first
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addressing whether the juror should have been dismissed for cause, and then whether the
error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court observed, as to "cause":
What is important is that she stated that her prior experience would make her
uncomfortable in deciding this case. We certainly do not impugn her honesty
and integrity when we refuse to take her answer to be dispositive of her
qualification to sit. . . . What is important is that despite her sincere
commitment to be fair, it was clearly possible that her personal traumatic
experience might affect her neutrality in some way because, as she stated,
making a decision would make her "uncomfortable" for reasons that went
beyond the discomfort that many jurors experience when rendering judgment.
Saunders II, 992 P.2d at 964 (emphasis added).
This "uncomfortable" feeling is comparable to how jurors in this case felt about
sitting in judgment on a medical doctor. In this case, for example, Mr. Morgan, Juror No. 2,
indicated during voir dire that he would not feel comfortable following the Court's
instruction concerning the awarding of damages. See Fact 10a. Potential Juror No. 3, David
Moss, expressed the same reservation and indicated that he would be unable to follow the
Court's instruction to award a fair and impartial verdict, should he find negligence, given his
feelings about how medical malpractice lawsuits have affected the cost of medical care
and/or insurance. See Fact 10b. Mr. Moss also revealed that the bias he had concerning
"professional litigants" would carry over into this trial and that this could be "potentially
damaging" to Plaintiffs. See Id. Juror No. 7, Kent Anderson, similarly stated that his feeling
as to the excessiveness of some awards could influence how he sees this case. See Fact 10c.
He called these feelings a "potential problem" and that there would be "a little bit of
hesitation" in any verdict he might render. See Id. Another juror, Douglas McOmie, Juror No.
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13, stated his feelings even more emphatically than did the problem juror in Saunders II,
when he stated that he felt "bitter" toward those who sue. See Fact lOd. Finally, Juror No.
20 actually stated that he was "tainted" when it came to medical malpractice claims. See Fact
lOe.
Predictably, the above jurors, after some "rehabilitation" by the Court, stated
that they would try to be fair. Under existing precedent, however, this is not good enough.
See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, % 49, 55 P.3d 573 ("a juror's subsequent statements that
she can be impartial will not of itself attenuate at the inference of bias."); Crawford v.
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091,1092 (Utah 1975) ("one doubts that a person harbors strong feeling
concerning anyone who would sue to recover money for the death of another could be a fair
and impartial juror."). None of the feelings expressed by those challenged for cause were
"light impressions." See West, 2004 UT 97, If 15. The presumption of bias went therefore
unrebutted and the Court erred in refusing to remove any of these jurors for cause. See Facts
lOa-e.
C.

New Trial Warranted. In order to determine whether a new trial is

warranted for failure to dismiss a juror for cause, a two-part test is applied. See State v.
Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 25,24 P.3d 948. The court in Wach enunciated this test as follows: (1)
Did the trial court exceed its discretion when it failed to excuse a prospective juror for
cause?, and (2) Did the failure to strike a prospective juror actually amount to prejudice to
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the party seeking a new trial? Id. at ^ 16. These factors when applied to this case warrant a
new trial.
First, the trial court committed error by failing to excuse for cause prospective
jurors who had voiced feelings of bias. See Fact 10. As discussed above, because the Court
failed to excuse the five jurors challenged for bias, Plaintiffs used their peremptory
challenges, and were thus prevented from striking others with less severe biases and/or
conservative viewpoints. According to the jury list, five jurors remained after the alternate,
Devin Tew, was taken. R.709-710. These persons would have been acceptable substitute
jurors for those that the Court should have struck for cause.
Second, because of the large amount of persons who expressed bias, Plaintiffs
were unable to remove all those who should have been removed by the Court. Specifically,
jurors Moss and Wilkey did not make "the cut." See Facts 10(b) and 10(e). So, in the end,
an individual who suspected that the Woods were "professional litigants" and who initially
said he could not follow the Court's instruction on awarding fair damages was seated
alongside a medical professional who from the outset said he was "tainted" against those who
bring medical malpractice claims and had expressed strong bias in favor of those who serve
in the military as Dr. Zeluff had. See Id. These two were combined with six others who for
the most part had expressed conservative, anti-Plaintiff views. (Recall that a majority of the
jury pool felt that medical malpractice claims increased medical and/or insurance costs. See
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Fact 9.) Plaintiffs were doomed with this jury from the start. A new trial is clearly warranted
under the circumstances.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED RELEVANT
EVIDENCE PROBATIVE OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE.
A.

Admissions by Defendant-Doctor Are Relevant Relevant evidence

is defined as evidence which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. The offered statements are
those made by Dr. Zeluff to plaintiff Steven Woods and include admissions that: (1) he had
"jumped the gun" [in doing the surgery], (2) should not have done the surgery and (3) he
"missed something." See Fact 1. The Court found these statements to be relevant. See Fact
4.
B.

Admissions of Party-Opponents Are Not Hearsay. Utah Rule of

Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) states that a "statement is not hearsay if... [t]he statement is offered
against a party and is (A) the party }s own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity" (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee's Note to Evidence
Rule 801 states: "A party's own statement is the classic example of an admission." 4
Weinstein's Evidence at 801 -41 (1981). Weinstein, supra, para. 801 (d)(2)(A)[01 ] states: 'All
that is required is that the statements have been made by the party . . . and that it be
introduced by an adverse party as in some way relevant - usually because it is contrary to
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a position that he is now taking." (Emphasis added.) Thus, at a threshold level, the statements
offered by Plaintiff concerning Dr. Zeluff come in as admissions by Defendant Dr. Zeluff,
a party-opponent in this action.
C.

Rule 403 Does Not Preclude Use of Zeluff s Statements. The basis

of the Court's exclusion of Defendant's admissions was that "the testimony is minimally
probative and is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice." See Order on
Defendants' Motions in Limine, R. 625 (emphasis added). As indicated above, the Court
never ruled that the evidence was irrelevant or that it was hearsay.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
(Emphasis added.) Because these statements were clearly probative and were not unfairly
prejudicial, it was error to exclude them
1. Statements Highly Probative. The Advisory Committee notes to the
parallel Federal Rule 403, state that "when the evidence is clearly relevant to a crucial issue
in the case, the prejudicial effect of putting it before the jury would have to be substantial,
indeed, to warrant its exclusion under Rule 403. Advisory Committee Note § 403.6 to Rule
403, Federal Rules of Evidence (emphasis added).
The statements excluded by the trial court went directly to whether Dr. Zeluff
breached the standard of care. This evidence, combined with that of Plaintiffs' expert
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orthopaedic surgeon, would tend to prove that Dr. Zeluff did in fact "jump the gun" when
he performed the surgery when there were other less-invasive treatments and procedures that
could and should have been implemented. His statement that he in essence should not have
done the surgery similarly provides further support for Plaintiffs' position that the toe joint
removal procedure was unnecessary in light of other options that Mr. Woods had. These were
not statements expressing remorse. They went to the Defendant's own assessment of the
surgery he performed - a key issue in this case. They are also probative for impeachment
purposes, for countering assertions by Dr. Zeluff, a named expert in Defendants' case, that
Mr. Woods' surgery was medically indicated.
Dr. Zeluff s statement that he had "missed something" is also probative of what
the actual toe joint looked like when he performed the surgery. Dr. Zeluff claimed at trial that
the toe joint he removed was damaged. Fact 11. Plaintiffs claimed that it was a healthy joint.
Id. Unfortunately, Dr. Zeluff nowhere described the condition of the joint and ordered the
pathology department to dispose of it. Id. The admission that he "missed something" as well
as his statement that he should not have done the surgery goes directly to what Dr. Zeluff saw
when he performed the operation. These statements are critical as rebuttal and/or
impeachment of Dr. Zeluff s position as to these issues.
The Court's exclusion of these statements is surprising given that it agreed that
the statements were probative. See Fact 4. Indeed, even though the Court seemed conflicted
on how Dr. Zeluff s statements could be interpreted ("was he commenting on standard of
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care or was he just expressing remorse, sorrow, embarrassment[?]"), it found that the
statements were "highly probative of medical negligence . . . ." R. 807:7, 21 (emphasis
added). Plaintiffs fully agree with this appraisal.
2. Statements Not Unfairly Prejudicial. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial
if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, if it appeals to
the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise
causes a jury to base its decision on something other than the facts of the case. Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds. Relevant
evidence will, of necessity, be prejudicial, else it would not be relevant. See e.g., United
States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2004) (involving federal counterpart to URE
403).
The prejudicial effect in this case would be that the statements amount to an
admission of negligence by Dr. Zeluff. While such admissions can be said to be prejudicial,
they cannot be said to be unfairly prejudicial. They are, after all, the witness' own statements.
And the statements go to a "crucial" issue in this case: was Dr. Zeluff negligent? There is no
basis to suggest that using these statements in trial against the Defendant would be unfair.
In reality, it was unfair to keep the Plaintiffs from using them.
The Defendants' claim that these admissions would be unduly prejudicial is
similar to the claim made by the Defendant in State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.2d 1115. In
that case, the defendant tried to keep out a statement he had made to a friend wherein he
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stated that he would not be implicated in his wife's death because he had been the "perfect
husband" for the past year. Id. at If 64. Although this statement was certainly prejudicial, it
was found to be highly probative of his involvement in his wife's murder and was not
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id., see also State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525
(Utah App.1990), cert, denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (allowing in audio-taped
admission of accused pornographer to show method of producing and distributing films,
where the probative value of the evidence was not found outweighed by undue prejudice).
3. Balancing Analysis Favors Plaintiffs. Advisory Committee notes to
Federal Rule 403 state that the balancing the trial court makes "should be the result of
according the proffered evidence the maximum reasonable probative value and the
minimum reasonable prejudicial value" Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403, Federal
Rules of Evidence, § 403.6 (emphasis added). In this balancing process, there is a bias in
favor of admitting relevant evidence. See United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 795 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) ("Rule 403 tilts, as do the rules as a whole, toward the admission of evidence in
closer cases").
If the statements in this case were accorded the "maximum reasonable
probative value," they would be seen as admissions by Dr. Zeluff that he had performed the
toe joint replacement surgery when it was not medically indicated and that he had otherwise
operated below the applicable standard of care. The statements would, the language of the
trial court, be "highly probative of medical negligence." R. 807:21. And although the
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statements would be prejudicial to Defendants, they would not be unfairly prejudicial.
It is reversable error when a trial court excludes evidence to a party's harm and
detriment. Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App. 229, f 15, 984 P.2d 404. An error is harmful if
it is "reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. Because
the Court erred in performing this balance and excluded critical evidence, Plaintiffs were
prejudiced. Plaintiffs are there entitled to a new trial so that this evidence may be presented
to a jury. Id.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs were entitled to a fair jury, not one contaminated with bias. This was
an openly outspoken group who were hostile to and/or had strong feelings against medical
malpractice claims. It was therefore crucial for Plaintiffs to exclude biased individuals from
the jury. As it stood, Plaintiffs ran out of peremptories and were unable to remove two biased
persons from the jury. Plaintiffs were therefore prejudiced and a new trial is warranted.
It was also error for the Court to exclude admissions previously made by
Defendant Dr. Zeluff at trial. These admissions went to the heart of Plaintiffs' claims and
were highly probative of key issues in the case. Although there would be some prejudice to
Defendants by including this evidence, it would not be evidence that could be considered
unfair prejudice. The verdict should therefore be overturned and a new trial ordered.
Dated this

day of December, 2005
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RON J. KRAMEfir
MATTHEW H. RATY
Attorneys for Appellants
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Attorneys for Defendants Gary R. Zeluff, M.D.,
Gary R. Zeluff, M.D., P.C., and
Utah Orthopaedic Associates

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN WOODS and
STACEY WOODS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

;
;
)
;)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
IN LIMINE

]

GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D.,
GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D., P.C.; and
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES,

]•
]
;)

p.c.

;
Defendants.

Judge: Robert K. Hilder
Case No.: 020906170 MP

]

Defendants filed Motions in Limine on or about March 25, 2005. Plaintiffs opposed that
motion on or about April 1, 2005. The Court heard oral argument on the motions on April 1,
2005. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, Ronald J. Kramer and Matthew Raty; defendants
were represented by counsel, Catherine M. Larson. Each party was afforded the opportunity to

argue their respective positions on the pending motions. The Court having reviewed the briefs
filed by the parties, entertained oral argument and for good cause appearing,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The Court reserves final decision on Motion in Limine No. 1. At present, Motion
No. 1 is granted. Evidence that Dr. Zeluff said that he jumped the gun, missed
something, or should not have done the subject surgery is inadmissible on the
grounds that the testimony is minimally probative and is substantially outweighed
by the dangers of unfair prejudice. If Plaintiffs can come up with something, the
Court will reconsider this ruling.

2.

The Court grants Motion in Limine No. 2 by stipulation of the parties. Evidence
from Diane Depew regarding criticisms made by Dr. Pilgram as to the care
rendered to Mr. Woods by Dr. Zeluff is inadmissible at trial.

3.

The Court denies Motion in Limine No. 3.

4.

The Court denies Motion in Limine No. 4,but will require witnesses testifying as
to the issues of back, hip and knee problems to satisfy the Court that there is
sufficient foundation to render such opinions.

5.

The Court grants Motion in Limine No. 5 by stipulation of the parties. Evidence
of standard of care opinions by Dr. Lynn Rasmussen are inadmissible at trial,
unless Defendant "opens the door" on this issue, at which point the Court must be
alerted and rule on that issue prior to any further inquiry on the subject.

DATED this jfi "day of April, 2005.
BYTH;
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I here by certify that on the

day of April 2005, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE was served, via facsimile,
to:
Ronald J. Kramer
11576 South State Street, Suite 501
Draper City, Utah 84020
Matthew Raty
480 East 400 South, # 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY 0 2 2005
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Dopiity Cterk''

Philip R. Fishier, #1083
Catherine M. Larson, #6597
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801)596-1508
Attorneys for Defendants Gary R. Zeluff, M.D. and
Utah Orthopaedic Associates

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN WOODS and
STACEY WOODS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

]
;
i
]

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

]

GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D.,
GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D., P.C.; and
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES,
P.C..

]
]i
]
I

Defendants.

)

Judge: Robert K. Hilder
Case No.: 020906170 MP

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, on April 4-8,2005, a jury of
eight men and women having been duly empaneled, the Plaintiffs appearing personally and by

and through their counsel, Ron J. Kramer and Matthew H. Raty, and Defendant appearing
personally and by and through counsel, Philip R. Fishier and Catherine M. Larson of the law firm
Strong & Hanni, the parties having presented their evidence and arguments, and the jury having
duly deliberated and having answered the following special interrogatory in reaching their
verdict:
1.

Considering all the evidence in this case, did the Defendant, Gary R. Zeluff, M.D.,
breach the applicable standard of care?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Based upon the foregoing response of the jury to the special interrogatories, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant be and the same is
hereby awarded judgment of no cause of action on the Plaintiffs' Complaint, thereby dismissing
Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendantwith prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this &< ~* day of>{5fii, 2005.
BY THE COURT

HpafahlYRobert K. Hlkfer
,( f
District Court Judge
\
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

By: /

Lnl

Mark&C: McLachlan
Ron J. Kramer
Matthew H. Raty
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the _ Z J i _ day of April, 2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, to:
Mark C. McLachlan, Esquire
MARK C. McLACHLAN & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
480 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ron J. Kramer, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiffs
11576 South State Street, Suite 501
Draper City, UT 84020
Matthew H. Raty, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiffs
480 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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